Abstract: In this article, we consider the recent increase in inequality in Indonesia. We make new, consistent estimates of expenditure inequality for 1993-2013, using several measures that draw on household expenditure data from the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) for 1993-2013. In doing so, we note that the central statistics agency, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), used grouped data for its estimatesof inequality until 2009 and that this underestimated inequality up to then. Thus the rise in inequality reported since 2009 actually has a longer history. We argue that Indonesia experienced divergence and convergence at the same time: the magnitude of the rise in inequality was significant (divergence), but the rise was greatest in provinces or districts with low initial levels of inequality (convergence). We consider the literature on drivers of changes in inequality and identify a set of hypotheses, with an empirical basis, which we introduce as potential Indonesian-specific drivers of rising inequality for future exploration.
INTRODUCTION
Inequality in Indonesia has recently become more visible in the public policy debate because the Gini coefficient has risen to the highest point ever reported by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), the central statistics agency. In light of this, we consider a set of indicators of expenditure inequality between 1993 and 2013, in order to assess the significance of this rise across a range of measures.
As is well known, expenditure survey data, such as those from Indonesia's National Socio-economic Survey (Susenas), understate income (and asset) Inequality because they ignore savings, for example, while top incomes largely elude surveys (see, for details, Leigh and Van der Eng 2010) . These are inherent shortcomings of all such surveys, not just Indonesia's, and Cornwell and Anas (2013) note ongoing attempts by BPS to address them. Unmeasured expenditure, too, is a serious concern in Susenas and similar surveys; Nugraha and Lewis (2013) find that inequality is much lower once non-market income is considered (In contrast, non-market consumption is already included in Susenas).
If one reviews existing studies of inequality in Indonesia, there are two points worth noting: First, some studies argue that expenditure inequality was relatively low before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and had not increased notably as a result of economic growth-in short, growth has been distributionally neutral (Akita, Kurniawan, and Miyata 2011; Hill 2008; Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama 2008; Van der Eng 2009 ). However, others argue that inequality was relatively high or rising even before the crisis (Frankema and Marks 2009; Leigh and Van der Eng 2010; Van Leeuwen and Foldvari 2012) . Second, a number of studies have argued that intragroup, urban-to-rural inequality and interregional inequality have increased since the crisis (Akita 2002; Akita and Miyata 2008; Sakamoto 2007; Skoufias 2001; Suryadarma et al. 2005 Suryadarma et al. , 2006 .
NEW ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY, 1993-2013 2a. Methodological Approach
We make new estimates of the evolution of expenditure inequality in Indonesia for 1993-2013, using data from Susenas.
1 To establish patterns in the data, we estimate the following indicators of inequality: the Gini coefficient (using individuals' data); the decile dispersion ratio of the average consumption of the richest 10%
of the population to the average consumption of the poorest 10%; and the interregional disparity by the Theil index of interprovincial inequality and interdistrict inequality. We decompose inequality by different subgroups of population and by region, using the decomposition technique of Haughton and Khandker (2009) .
This makes it possible to estimate the contributions of urban and rural inequality and interprovincial disparity to total inequality. This trend is slightly stronger in rural areas outside Java than those in Java. Our provincial-and district-level analysis captures a pattern of convergence (see figure 4 ):
2b. The Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient
the rate of increase in the Gini coefficient tended to befaster in provinces with initially low inequality, and vice versa. 
2c. Top Incomes and the Decile Dispersion Ratio
The decile dispersion ratio is the ratio of the mean expenditure of the richest 10%
of households (as captured in Susenas) to that of the poorest 10% of households.
3 Figure 5 shows the development of the decile dispersion ratio from 1993 to 2013
for Indonesia, urban areas, rural areas, Java, and non-Java regions. Between 1993
and 2013, the decile dispersion ratio declined moderately prior to the 1997-98 crisis, fell further during the crisis, and increased rapidly after the crisis up to 2013.
The trend in the decile dispersion ratio over the last decade suggests that
Inequality rose more notably than that made visible by the Gini coefficient 
2d. Interregional Inequality
The final dimension of income disparity in Indonesia that we consider is interregional inequality, of which the Theil index is one of the most common measures.
We calculate it here for both interprovincial inequality and interdistrict inequality.
The result is shown in figure 6 . The estimates suggest that, for each year, interregional The discussion so far, on different indicators of inequality, suggests that inequality in Indonesia has risen rapidly in the last 10 years, after having been somewhat stable, and even declining slightly, prior to the 1997-98 crisis. There are also some measures of inequality,such as the generalised entropy index, that can be decomposed into inequality of individual households within one particular group and inequality within those particular groups. For example, looking at figure 7, we can say that inequality in Indonesia in 2013 was driven primarily (93.7%) by within-province inequality. Inequality between provinces contributed only 6.3% to overall inequality.
Similar patterns are evident between urban and rural areas. Inequality between urban and rural areas contributes only a small proportion (5.8%) to inequality in Indonesia.
The largest contribution comes from inequality within urban and rural areas.
Looking at the trends in the share of inequality between provinces and between urban and rural areas, we find that the data suggest that the contribution of inequality between provinces and between urban and rural areas has declined consistently since 1993. Conversely, the contribution of inequality of individual households within provinces and within urban and rural areas has increased consistently(figure 7). The explanation for this trend, drawing on the earlier discussion, is simply that rising inequality in Indonesia since 2003 has been common or uniform across geographical locations, whereas the gap between regions has been either consistent or decreasing slightly in more recent years.
THE DRIVERS OF CHANGES IN INEQUALITY IN INDONESIA 3a. The Pattern of Economic Growth
One proximate cause of increasing inequality in Indonesia is the pattern of economic growth. Table 1 shows the growth rate in real per capita expenditure during four periods: the last period, 2003-13, represents the post-crisis and reformasi era. We calculate the growth rate in annual real expenditure per capita for different poverty lines and consumption percentiles (to avoid determinism): the mean of the population, the median of the whole population, the poor as defined by the national poverty line, the poor as defined by the $2-a-day moderate international poverty line (2005 PPP dollars) , and several consumption percentiles.
5
Looking at growth during 1993-2013, we see that while the growth rate in expenditure per person of the mean of population was 3.7% per year, the growth rates of the national poverty line and the $2 a day poor were 3.0% and 3.2%, respectively. In other words, by the national poverty line the expenditure per capita 5 On international poverty lines, see Sumner and Edward (2014) .
of the average population grew 22% faster than that of the poor, and grew 15%
faster by the $2-a-day, moderate international poverty line.
The 'pro-poorness' of growth has worsened since the start of the reformasi era.
By the national poverty line, during 1990-1996, in the pre-reformasi era, the growth of the average population was 77% faster than the growth of the poor; during 2003-13 the growth in expenditure per capita of the mean average population was more than twice (2.1 times) the growth rate of the poor (5.4% vs 2.6%). For the period 1990-96 the annual average growth rate of expenditure per person (in real terms) was 3.5% ayear-or 37% faster than that of those living on less than $2 a day, at 2.6% a year.In the reformasi era, however, the annual average growth rate of expenditure per person in the average population was 97% faster than that of those living on less than $2 a day. In short, there is a big difference between the two periods.
3b. Potential Drivers of Inequality in Indonesia
The global literature has identified a set of factors that drive expenditure inequality (see UNDP 2014 for a recent substantial review of conceptual and empirical literature). One way of grouping these factors is into exogenous and endogenous drivers. The former relate to shifting global trade and finance patterns and technical change; the latter to macroeconomic policies, labour market polices, wealth inequality, fiscal policy (taxation and transfers), and government spending on public goods.
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The causes of recent changes in inequality in Indonesia are complex, but it is possible to identify a set of specific factors, with sufficient empirical evidence, that would be worthy of future exploration. In Indonesia, exogenous examples of these factors relate to trade. For example, Indonesia experienced a commodity boom in coal and palm oil during 2000s, in particular, which may have increased inequality. Coal production more than tripled and palm oil production quadrupled during 2000-11 (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012, 318) . Yusuf et al. (2013) use a computable general equilibrium model to show that the commodity boom increased inequality but that those changes in inequality were due to world prices of mining commodities rather than those of estate crops. 7 Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto (2012) note that changing sectoral contributions to growth are associated with slowing poverty reduction, and thus potentially with changes in inequality. The commodity boom hypothesis could be advanced to explain the widening gap between poor and rich groups within rural areas.
During more or less the same period (as discussed above), there has been a rise in the prices of commodities-particularly of Indonesia's traditional export commodities, such as estate crops. These estate crops are grown mainly in rural areas and owned by rural landowners. The richer rural households will benefit disproportionately from this boom. We can see the signs of this mechanism at work ownership that has driven increasing within-country inequality around the world. This may also have been the case in Indonesia. Leigh and Van der Eng (2009, 197-98) briefly discuss the distribution of wealth in Indonesia. Davies et al. (2009) offer the only estimate of wealth distribution in Indonesia (which is based on the 1997 Indonesia Family Life Survey). 7 The price changes of estate crops still affect positively low income households because many of those households include members who are employed as plantation workers.
by comparing inequality in rural areas in Java and non-Java regions, because most estate crop plantations are outside Java. A second exogenous factor related to trade is that of rice prices, which rose by 20% during 2003-5 after having been stable for a long period. Inequality also spiked during 2003-5, and although there are several possible reasons for this spike, the increase in domestic rice prices may have reduced the real expenditure of the poor.
Endogenous drivers of expenditure inequality in Indonesia include changes in the labour market and in fiscal policy. Yusuf et al. (2013) argue that changes in the formal labour market, including interrelated changes in labour market regulation-an increase in severance payments, the strengthening of labour unions, rising minimum wages, reduced demand for unskilled labour, and greater informality in low-wage employment-have increased inequality. Growth of formal employment was rather stagnant in the last decade, owing to slow growth in the manufacturing sector. Before the 1997-98 crisis, the manufacturing sector was the primary source of Indonesia's economic growth. During 1990-96, for example, the sector's GDP growth was 11.2% (while average economic growth was 7.9%) and its employment growth was 6.0% (while average national employment growth was only 2.3%). Almost a decade after the crisis, employment growth in the 
CONCLUSION
We have analysed the evolution of expenditure inequality in Indonesia between1993
and 2013 in order to discuss the significance of the recent rise in expenditure inequality. More specifically, we have asked whether inequality in Indonesia increased over the period across a range of inequality measures-and, if it did,how rapidly-and the extent to which regional, provincial, and urban and rural differences shaped the overall pattern and the extent to which these components drove the overall trend.
Our consistent estimates suggest that inequality in Indonesia has been rising significantly. However, the rise in inequality is predominantly visible in the period after the 1997-98 crisis, or the reformasi era of political reform and democratisation.
Before the crisis, inequality was relatively stable and moderate if not declining. The magnitude of the more recent rises in inequality is startling. Furthermore, rising inequality is more or less common across regional dimensions, urban and rural areas, and Java and non-Java regions.
We think that BPS's estimates of inequality before 2009 underestimated inequality, owing to the use of grouped data; the rise in inequality reported since 2009 therefore has a longer history. Indonesia is experiencing both divergence and convergence at the same time; the magnitude of the rise in inequality is significantyet the change in inequality has been greatest in provinces or districts with low initial levels of inequality. We propose a set of hypotheses, not necessarily mutually exclusive, that may play an important role in explaining rising inequality in Indonesia. We present these hypotheses, based on initial empiricalwork, for future exploration. The recent commodity boom may influence urban and rural inequality, but this is not clear.
Rigidity in the formal labour market maybe significant, and the evidence for this is clearer. It is likely that rice prices and cash transfer programs have contributed to changes in inequality because of their relative impacts on the living standards of the poorer groups of the population versus their impacts on those of better-off groups, all of which suggests that a better understanding of the drivers of changes in inequality in Indonesia is essential to help public policy better address rising inequality in Indonesia. 
